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Christian world 
 
Liana Chua, Cambridge University 
 
This article seeks to render ignorance analytically and ethnographically 
productive by exploring practices and tropes of knowing and not-knowing among 
young Christian Bidayuhs in Sarawak, Malaysian Borneo. It argues that these 
Bidayuhs’ professed ignorance of the old ‘religion’, adat gawai, cannot be 
dismissed as a simple lack of knowledge or reflection of sheer indifference. 
Instead, their invocations of ignorance could be understood as a productive, 
empowering device for dealing with the dangers of living in a world in which 
religious conversion remains an ongoing, incomplete process. Through this 
ethnographic analysis, the article also offers a reflexive critique of the knowledge-
centred impulses that often shape anthropology’s epistemological and 
methodological projects. 
 
 
‘Most ethnographers are at some level constantly on the look-out for at 
least partial reincarnations of Muchona, and in my experience, a great 
number claim to have found them’ (Metcalf 2002: 20). 
 
 
As people who know – and more importantly, reveal what they know – 
‘informants’ have long been central to the anthropological enterprise. In 
ethnographic lore, the paradigm of such ‘native exegetes’ was probably Muchona 
the Hornet, Interpreter of Religion, whose methodical and lively expositions on 
 2 
Ndembu ritual gained fame through the work of Victor Turner (1967). But more 
than being a valuable informant, Muchona’s purported exegetical prowess has 
turned him into ‘a model and an ideal for many ethnographers’ (ibid.: 19), whose 
task has conventionally been to pursue ‘local knowledge’ (Geertz 1983) as well as 
to purvey it, transform it into ‘anthropological knowledge’. We seek knowledge in 
local Muchonas, one might say, in order to be like him, the adroit knowledge-
broker, in a discipline which is fundamentally and teleologically knowledge-
oriented. 
 
   During fieldwork in a Bidayuh village in Sarawak, Malaysian Borneo, I too 
discovered my share of Muchona-like informants, who were keen to ‘make me 
know’ what would later crystallize in my ethnography as aspects of ‘local culture’. 
But equally and perhaps more prominent were many non-Muchonas who could or 
would not expound on the things I asked about. To a degree, their recalcitrance 
stemmed from simple indifference, uncertainty, or the inability, as ethnographers 
so often find, to articulate what they grasped through practice and instinct. Some 
of these silences were shattered as I grew into my role as a ‘student of culture’ in 
my fieldsite. But many others lingered to the end; and I eventually realized that 
certain protestations of ignorance were quite heartfelt. 
 
   This was especially noticeable when young adults talked about adat gawai1 – 
the ‘indigenous’ ritual complex almost uniformly practised in Bidayuh villages 
until the 1970s, and still observed today by small and ever-diminishing clutches of 
nyamba gawai (gawai elders). Born and raised as Christians, these Bidayuhs 
readily concede that adat gawai is their ‘tradition’ or ‘culture’, as it is often 
depicted in national multiculturalist discourses. Beyond that, however, their 
knowledge of it is usually patchy at best. Like most other villagers, they agree that 
when the nyamba gawai die, it will be lost because nobody else knows it. This is 
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not because adat gawai knowledge is particularly secretive or exclusive; indeed 
its practitioners frequently assert that anybody can learn it, although it takes many 
years to become truly adept. But the prospect of even fleeting acquaintance does 
not appeal to most young adults, who prefer to watch today’s periodic gawai 
rituals from the sidelines in blissful ignorance. At such events, they often reiterate 
to visitors and ethnographers that they know nothing about it, stating with 
seeming nonchalance that ‘this is what people in the old days followed. We are all 
Christian, so there is no need to learn about adat gawai.’ 
 
   Anthropologists of religious conversion would probably find such repudiations 
of ‘old’ knowledge frustratingly familiar. And in the Bidayuh case, the reasons for 
them are often prosaic or political. Plain lack of interest is a common culprit; 
sheer impracticality another. For many people, Christianity’s allure lies in its 
consonance with ‘modernity’: a sentiment arguably fanned by community leaders’ 
and politicians’ exhortations to young Bidayuhs to discard those aspects of 
‘traditional (village-centred) culture’ which impede their socio-economic progress 
in the ‘modern’ nation (Kiong 2003; Minos 2000; Sarok 2003). Indeed, those who 
have heeded that call and found education or employment in Malaysia’s Muslim-
majority urban centres have increasingly turned to Christianity as a buffer against 
peer pressure to convert to Islam (Chua 2007b: 274). In this milieu, it is hardly 
surprising that most young Bidayuh adults feel little compulsion to know about 
adat gawai, and even less compulsion to explain why. What is striking, however, 
is that despite their apparent apathy, few have relegated it to the status of 
superstition or misapprehension. Instead, as I shall argue, another reason for these 
young adults’ desire not to know ‘the old ways’ may stem precisely from the fact 
that they take them quite seriously. Understanding why this is so mandates an 
analysis not only of the contents of such knowledge, but also of the mechanisms 
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of knowing and not-knowing bound up in adat gawai and other aspects of village 
life.  
 
   The aim of this article is thus not to deny the plethora of mundane and political 
reasons for young Bidayuhs’ ignorance of adat gawai, but to add some depth to 
what might otherwise be construed as a straightforward tale of knowledge-loss. 
Rather than allowing ignorance to fall by the analytical wayside as the absence or 
inverse of knowledge, I take it as the starting point for an investigation into 
Bidayuh practices of knowing and not-knowing in a world which, as one of my 
village friends put it, is ‘not yet pure Christian’. This investigation illuminates 
certain conceptions of agency and causality which have influenced people’s 
decisions in the space between what they call the ‘old (gawai) world’ and the 
‘modern (Christian)’ one. In the process, I shall reflect on common 
anthropological knowledge practices, which are often geared towards the pursuit 
of ‘local knowledge’ while treating ignorance on the part of both ethnographer 
and informant as a problem to be overcome. And yet, it is precisely in those gaps 
and silences – which we hope our Muchonas will fill – that ethnographic 
revelations can sometimes be found.  
 
 
From adat gawai to Christianity: historical and ethnographic notes on 
Bidayuh conversion 
 
The Bidayuh are Sarawak’s second largest indigenous group, encompassing 
several different dialect-speaking communities within their 210,000-strong 
population.2  Since the mid-nineteenth century – when the Brooke Raj (1841-
1946)3 enforced generally peaceable relations between feuding groups – they have 
lived in villages in the mountainous hinterlands of Kuching, planting rice, crops, 
 5 
and raw commodities such as rubber and cocoa up to about the 1970s. This rice-
based agricultural system formed the basis of the ‘indigenous’ complex of rituals 
and practices commonly known as adat gawai.4 Briefly translated, adat means 
both ‘customary law’ and ‘way of life’, while gawai conflates ‘festival’, 
‘ceremony’, and ‘feast’ (Nais 1988: 155) – the main events at which such adat is 
observed and reinforced (Adat Bidayuh 1994: 25). Consisting mainly of a series 
of rituals held at various stages of the ‘rice year’, adat gawai’s basic objective is 
to bless and invoke the blessings of the rice spirit, as well as ancestor spirits and 
other benevolent entities from the surrounding mountains, rivers, and jungles – 
while also keeping malevolent spirits at bay. Most rituals entail several hours or 
nights of prayers, processions, and chants designed to draw the ‘good’ spirits to 
the longhouse veranda where offerings of food, betel nut, and tobacco await them 
in return for their goodwill, blessings, and protection.  
 
   Until about thirty years ago, adat gawai’s major ceremonies were village-wide 
affairs. Entire longhouses would observe specific rituals at the same agricultural 
time, with each household contributing substantial amounts of labour and 
resources to the proceedings. Such inter-household coordination was particularly 
important owing to the need to uniformly observe the many pantang (‘taboos’ or 
prohibitions) accompanying the rituals. After certain ceremonies, for example, 
longhouses would be closed to all traffic for several days, and their inhabitants 
barred from eating specific foods or performing various tasks. The penalties for 
breaking pantang were severe; and most people preferred not to risk spiritual 
punishment or a hefty fine by the village and ritual heads (Adat Bidayuh 1994:  
iv-v). In theory, at least, adat gawai both sanctioned and depended upon the 
entanglement of livelihood (rice planting) and ‘religious’ practice.  
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   In the late-nineteenth century, this tight bundle of ‘work’ and ‘prayer’ (Howes 
1960: 493) severely impeded the success of the few early Anglican missions to be 
established in Bidayuh areas. Abetted by the paternalistic ethos of the Brooke Raj, 
and to a lesser degree by the British government (1946-1963), the Bidayuhs’ rice-
planting system remained shielded from commercial exploitation and 
development well into the twentieth century (Grijpstra 1976: 38-39; Kaur 1995; 
Ooi 1997). In 1963, however, Sarawak gained independence as a state of 
Malaysia. Its incorporation into the new nation was rapidly followed by an era of 
intensive rural development – notably through a series of ‘Malaysia Plans’ (Loh 
and Kahn 1992) – which introduced infrastructural improvements, large scale 
cash-cropping, wages, and ‘modern’ accoutrements such as radios, cars, concrete 
houses, and electricity to Bidayuh villages. At the same time, the extension of 
educational facilities and affirmative action policies designed to boost indigenous 
participation in the economy and civil service (King 1988; Siddique and 
Suryadinata 1981) generated a steady outflow of villagers to Kuching and other 
urban areas for schooling and employment.5 
 
   This population trickle severely drained the agricultural workforce, and by the 
1980s, rice cultivation was no longer the prevalent economic activity among 
Bidayuh communities. These developments proved deleterious to adat gawai, the 
labour-intensive tasks of which became harder to fulfil as the villages’ able-
bodied populations shrank. More significantly, many young Bidayuhs, now 
regular school-goers and workers, grew unable or unwilling to comply with 
gawai-based restrictions on movement around the longhouse and village. 
Consequently, numerous households armed with urban wages ‘became modern’ 
by moving into detached houses or establishing new villages, unfettered by gawai 
constraints (Lindell 2000). Eventually, Bidayuh longhouses – the loci of adat 
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gawai rituals – began disintegrating, with entire sections being demolished or left 
dilapidated from the 1980s.  
 
   Post-independence changes thus unmoored adat gawai from its rice-planting 
base, opening a space for a new adat with which to meet the challenges of ‘the 
modern world’. It was in this climate that Christianity tentatively began advancing 
in Bidayuh villages in various denominations.6 Its most effective proponents were 
youthful returnees who had converted while working or studying in urban areas. 
Christianity was deemed compatible with their self-consciously ‘modern’ lifestyle, 
enabling them to move freely in and out of the village and to pray anywhere, 
independent of agricultural demands. Building on the rudimentary foundations 
laid by earlier missions (Saunders 1992: 6) as well as the support of a small pool 
of priests and nuns, these young Bidayuhs were instrumental in encouraging 
large-scale conversion to Christianity. Adat Christian, as many call it, was 
depicted as a viable and equally efficacious replacement for the prescriptions of 
adat gawai – how to stay healthy, keep away evil, and do well in the world – 
without similarly inhibiting prohibitions. Its initial appeal was thus less doctrinal 
than instrumental; indeed it was not uncommon in the 1960s and 1970s for 
individuals and households to ‘hedge their bets’, as an elderly missionary put it, 
by switching between adat gawai and Christian practice in order to get things 
done. 
 
   Subsequently, conversion took on a life of its own. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
many older people began ‘following’ their children into Christianity, often for 
reasons unconnected to being ‘modern’. First, many deemed it easier to be 
Christian, which primarily involved ‘sitting down’ for a few hours in church on 
Sundays (Harris 2001: 10), than to constantly abide by adat gawai’s numerous 
labour-intensive and often restrictive regulations. Secondly, many nyamba gawai 
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were persuaded to convert by the fear that their (Christian) children would not 
know the gawai rites to send their souls to the appropriate ‘village’ after death, 
thereby leaving them stranded. Many thus ‘entered’ Christianity, secure in the 
knowledge that their children’s prayers would at least get them to Jesus’ village – 
heaven (cf. Lindell 2000: 192; Schiller 1997: 144). By the 1990s, over ninety-five 
percent of Bidayuhs had become Christian. The majority are Anglican or Catholic, 
although much smaller presences include Methodists, Seventh-Day Adventists, 
and the evangelical SIB (Sidang Injil Borneo). Most Bidayuhs, however, define 
themselves primarily as ‘Christian’, a term under which they consciously subsume 
denominational affiliations. As I explain elsewhere (Chua 2007a: 88-91, 147-149), 
this has engendered a discursive and ideological notion of Christian sameness 
which takes precedence over denominational differences in most contexts: a 
tendency which I shall reproduce in this paper by referring to Christianity as a 
single generic entity. 
 
   Amid all this, there remain small pockets of nyamba gawai in certain villages 
who, for various reasons, have chosen not to convert. Accordingly, the forms of 
adat gawai they observe have evolved to keep pace with changing circumstances. 
Although contemporary gawai practice is still oriented towards the well-being of 
the rice crop and the village at large, the niche it occupies within community life 
has steadily diminished. Owing to the lack of manpower and inter-household 
coordination, only a few key ceremonies are now observed annually, and 
prohibitions on work and movement tend to centre on individual practitioners and 
their households rather than being enforced across longhouses or the village. (In 
my fieldsite, moreover, ‘modern’ occupations such as office work and school, in 
which practitioners’ children and grandchildren might be involved, are excluded 
from adat gawai’s prohibitionary remit.) Consequently, as we shall see below, 
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adat gawai rituals have also become community events at which spectators far 
outnumber practitioners.  
 
   With adat gawai practices and conversion to Christianity still fresh in collective 
memory, many Bidayuhs depict themselves as living in a transitional world which, 
to draw on the expression cited earlier, is ‘impurely Christian’. This does not, 
however, imply that adat gawai and Christianity are radically different 
phenomena. Instead, many Bidayuhs arguably see conversion as a movement 
along a continuum7 with ‘pure’ adat gawai and Christian poles. Both gawai and 
Christianity are treated as adat, and both have functioned as key social and 
temporal regulators of community life. This is the case even in the many villages 
with more than one denomination: as the only sites where people congregate 
weekly, each church serves as a communal node at which announcements are 
made and events arranged. Like adat gawai, Christianity is ‘suffusive’ (Schiller 
1997: 78), spilling into houses, farms, and schools. Occasions such as birthdays, 
deaths, weddings, new jobs, the completion of a house, or even the purchase of a 
new car invariably warrant prayer sessions and large communal meals. Even rice-
planting has not lain neglected: crosses have replaced gawai ritual barriers and 
offering bundles at the small remaining farms (cf. Howes 1960: 489), and rice 
stalks are blessed at special church services held around harvest time. 
 
   As these examples suggest, adat gawai and Christianity are fundamentally ways 
of getting things done – staying safe, encouraging a bountiful harvest, or ensuring 
a safe journey (also see Geddes 1954: 32; Harris 2001: 157). The knowledge 
associated with them is accordingly performative: for many people, to know adat 
gawai or Christianity is to know what to do, say, and use in order to achieve a 
desired effect. There is, however, an additional factor upon which the efficacy of 
these prescriptions is contingent: the cooperation of certain spiritual parties, 
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ranging from the rice spirit to Jesus and the saints. This is especially important in 
the observance of adat gawai, whereby relations between humans and spirits are 
mediated by the obligation to ‘let each other know’ what is happening. As we 
shall see, it is in these instances that the entanglement of knowledge and 
relationality becomes most explicit – and, for many Christian Bidayuhs, most 
dangerous. 
 
 
Knowledge and relationality in the observance of adat gawai 
 
When gawai rituals are held in my fieldsite, they almost always attract a 
substantial audience of local (Christian) inhabitants, lured to the longhouse by the 
sound of gongs resounding across the village and mountains. Despite being 
followers of a different adat, they see such periodic events as ordinary, if irregular, 
features of village life, worthy of support and spectatorship. Several have even 
become regular helpers at rituals, providing manual assistance to the increasingly 
frail nyamba gawai by collecting bamboo from the jungle to construct the ‘altar’ 
on which offerings are hung, playing gongs to accompany their dances, and 
cooking the sacrificial animals. Also present at these events are lively, chattering 
clusters of young adults and children. Like the gawai helpers, many of them work 
or go to school in urban areas, returning to visit friends and family in the village at 
weekends. For them, gawai ritual attendance is just one of several options for a 
night out; a plausible alternative to karaoke sessions, discos at the community hall, 
or barbecues by the river. 
 
   During these ceremonies, participants and audience members are generally free 
to talk, roam about, use the toilet, pass around beers and betel nut, or document 
the proceedings: as elsewhere in Borneo, ‘the sociality of ritual is an aspect of its 
 11 
sacredness, and not a byproduct or distraction’ (Metcalf 1991: 9). There are, 
however, certain hazardous moments during each ritual – particularly when the 
spirits, attracted by the invitational chants of the women, congregate before the 
offerings at the altar – when everyone in the immediate vicinity, Christian, 
nyamba gawai, and visitor alike, has to be capak’ed, or anointed with a mixture of 
turmeric, coconut, oil, and sometimes chicken blood. Capak, my acquaintances 
explain, keeps a person’s soul strong to stop it being frightened by the spirits that 
turn up, while also ‘telling’ (da’an) the spirits not to harm its bearers. At the 
rituals I attended, capak would be accepted without protest by those to whom it 
was offered; even if they did not know why or how these substances worked, they 
knew that they risked being harmed without it.  
 
   Such complicity was rooted in two common understandings. First, widespread 
conversion to Christianity has not caused the death or demystification of the ‘old’ 
spirits in the eyes of converts. Instead, such spirits are deemed to remain real and 
efficacious, as long as their existence is generated and sustained by the adat-
based actions, offerings, and prayers of the nyamba gawai. This was explained to 
me by a well-educated civil servant in her mid-forties during a post-harvesting 
gawai ritual. While she would willingly attend gawai events as a gesture of 
support, she would not spend the night at the longhouse at ritual’s end, as was the 
custom, because the veranda would by then be filled with spirits who might 
‘disturb’ people nearby. Being Christian, she said in English, she did not ‘believe’ 
in these spirits – by which she meant pray to and do other things to engage with 
them – but this not alleviate the danger of simply being near the nyamba gawai. 
The only time she would truly feel safe, she reflected, was when all the nyamba 
gawai had died, and there was nobody left to ‘believe’ in the ‘old’ spirits, which 
would then disappear.8 Later, I had a similar discussion with a senior female 
gawai practitioner, who speculated that when all the nyamba gawai had died, the 
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spirits would probably learn to listen to Christian prayers – and maybe even 
become Christian too.  
 
   This exegetical framework strongly emphasizes the capacity of humans to 
generate and (re)shape the existence and presence of the spirits with whom they 
engage through adat gawai and Christianity. It was this principle, I suggest, which 
underlay many elderly people’s decisions to convert in order to safeguard their 
post-mortem fate: this was not an admission of Christianity’s superior efficacy, 
but acknowledgement that their souls’ well-being would be directly sustained by 
their children’s prayers and actions. This is also the reason that ‘old’ dangers are 
seen to exist mainly in villages where adat gawai is practised, and less so in towns 
or ‘pure’ Christian villages. But human agency is not tantamount to human 
control: once relations are established, spirits themselves are quite capable of 
taking action. This was the basis of the second understanding shared by the capak 
recipients, who all acknowledged that the nyamba gawai were entangled in an 
adat-regulated relationship with the spirits they had summoned. Although no 
Bidayuh equivalent for the encompassing anthropological term ‘relations’ exists, 
there are various modes by which connections between different entities are 
revealed and articulated. These include notions of movement between groups and 
places, gifting practices, and most pertinently here, the trope of ‘knowing’. In the 
practice of adat gawai, humans and spirits are, crucially, obliged to let each other 
know what is happening: it is at these points that relations between them 
crystallize. At many rituals, it is a basic courtesy for the nyamba gawai to inform 
the spirits through capak not to harm its human bearers; having been ‘made to 
know’, it becomes incumbent on the spirits to comply.  
 
   When adat gawai was widely followed, such reciprocity was observed – 
admittedly not always perfectly – in many realms of village life. For example, it 
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was good practice for people entering the jungle to inform the spirits within of 
their intrusion by smearing their forehead with earth or stashing a rolled-up leaf 
behind their ear. Minor rituals were also held prior to the start of certain events – 
planting, hunting in the jungle, a long journey, or construction – to let nearby 
spirits know what was about to happen. Having been informed thus, the spirits 
were obliged to let things transpire, and even aid their endeavours. Conversely, 
humans would look out for ‘omens’ sent by spirits before commencing. These 
could take various guises, including animal sightings, clouds, or sneezing; but 
birds were by far the most common and significant (Roth 1980: 221-231). 9 
Whether messengers or incarnations of spirits – one old man described them as 
telephones – they foretold the future through their cries and flight paths. Some 
signs were auspicious, but many warned of imminent dangers, including accidents, 
deaths, or bad harvests. Having been ‘made to know’ these risks, people were 
obliged to stop, postpone their tasks, or further appease the spirits and seek more 
signs. 10  Failure to do so could result in injury, sickness, or even death. 
Interestingly, spirits were deemed more forgiving of plain ignorance of the rules 
than of absent-minded transgressions (cf. Schiller 1997: 83). Even unintentional 
slights by those who really should have known – misreading an omen or 
forgetting to perform a ritual task – could beget serious consequences.  
 
   ‘Letting each other know’ thus situates humans and spirits on the same 
relational plane: to know is to be socially obligated. But as the above paragraph 
suggests, there is an important caveat: humans and spirits can only be successfully 
‘made to know’ if they possess the knowledge that enables them to recognize 
what is being communicated in the first place. Where and how the spirits obtain 
their knowledge is, for most of my acquaintances, not a matter for explication or 
concern. Bidayuhs are quite willing to concede their incomplete knowledge of the 
worlds and ways of spirits; what is important is what humans know, and what 
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they do about it (cf. Metcalf 1991: 47; Schiller 1997: 78). Humans attain their 
knowledge through various relationships and modalities. A gawai practitioner, for 
example, might teach her granddaughters to chant, pressing a few grains of 
cooked rice and salted fish to their lips to ensure they remember what they have 
learned; more fleetingly, spirits might ‘give’ humans the skill of healing, often in 
the form of a small stone, in their dreams. Once acquired, such knowledge has the 
capacity to then generate relations with – and sustain the very existence of – the 
relevant spirits.  
 
   The practice of adat gawai thus entails at least two sets of relations: those 
through which knowledge is conveyed, and those which are brought into being by 
the acquisition and use of that knowledge.11 In describing these different packages 
of knowledge and relationality, however, my informants tend to use a single verb: 
pu’an, to know. The scope of pu’an is sufficiently vague to encompass great 
variation in types and degrees of knowledge. For example, people may be said to 
know about (pu’an) omens through conversations with their parents; but their 
possession of this adat-governed knowledge simultaneously entangles them in 
relations with omen animals, such that when birds ‘let them know’ (da yǔh pu’an) 
about dangers ahead, they are obliged to respond. The second set of relations thus 
pivots on the point of knowing, at which one’s existing knowledge and its 
associated relations are ‘activated’ through recognition of specific forms: the 
capak sign on people’s foreheads or a bird call, for instance. In this respect, 
knowing adat gawai is an inherently performative process of positioning oneself 
within a ‘field of relations’ in which ‘beings of all kinds…continually and 
reciprocally bring one another into existence’ (Ingold 2006: 12).12  
 
   This tight entanglement of knowledge, knowing, and relationality is not 
confined to adat gawai. Non-Bidayuhs who have married into Bidayuh villages, 
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for instance, are said to have ‘become’ (jadi) Bidayuh13 when ‘they now know’ 
village adat: how to speak its dialect, work on its farms, eat its food, or weave its 
baskets, all of which must be acquired and practised through village relationships. 
Perhaps the strongest gesture of acceptance for incomers is their acquisition of a 
village teknonym: an intrinsically relational appellation which identifies its bearer 
through his or her progeny and the familial networks in which they are enmeshed. 
It is only through months and years of interaction with other villagers, however, 
that knowledge of such networks – the ability to know who’s who – can be built 
up. Possessing and using teknonyms thus not only reflects how much one knows 
about village networks, but also establishes and sustains one’s social position – 
and those of others – within them.   
 
   The converse occurs when people move out of the village or spend most of their 
lives in cities. When the relations that bind them to specific places are severed or 
weakened, so too is the knowledge they sustain. While sitting with an elderly 
woman who was preparing sago paste – a process requiring dexterity and 
immaculate timing – I commented that one of my friends who lived in the city and 
returned to the village at weekends had recently made the same with markedly 
less success. ‘Of course she’s not clever at making sago,’ my companion replied, 
stirring vigorously; ‘she no longer lives in the village’. This comment did not 
simply concern my friend’s undoubted lack of practice, but the fact that certain 
types of knowledge are indelibly acquired, maintained, and indeed instantiated 
through relations in the village. Indeed I was frequently reminded of this by the 
old ladies with whom I spent many afternoons learning to winnow rice and weave 
baskets. Although they mused that I too had ‘become’ Bidayuh after several 
months of fieldwork, their awareness of my impending departure left them no 
illusions about my potential for Bidayuh housewifery. ‘Your work is different,’ 
they noted, when explaining my early abject failures at winnowing. Instead, my 
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work – what I knew best – was reading and writing so that I could tell others 
about life in their village. This was an acknowledgement of the different relational 
framework from which I had come, and to which I would soon return. 
 
 
Knowledge, agency, and intention 
 
The link between knowing and relationality demonstrated by these examples is 
not, of course, unique to Bidayuh society. Indeed, we can gain conceptual 
illumination by turning briefly to another body of literature, ethnographically 
situated halfway across the world from Sarawak: recent work on kinship 
knowledge in the West. In an influential article in this field, Marilyn Strathern 
argues that if ‘self-knowledge’ is ‘foundational to [Euro-American] personal 
identity’ (1999: 68), then the mere act of acquiring information on one’s 
parentage has an ‘immediate (simultaneous) “social” effect’ (ibid.: 75): ‘knowing 
something about one’s kin is also knowing something about oneself’ (ibid.: 77). In 
these situations – such as when adopted children discover their biological parents 
– the knower has little choice over the relations engendered by such knowledge, 
because ‘relationships come into being when the knowledge does’ (ibid.: 78). Its 
effects, in Strathern’s words, are ‘built-in’ (ibid.: 75). Pivotal to the situation is 
not the content of knowledge but the fact of knowing, through which personal 
identity and relations are inexorably brought into existence. The subject only 
exercises a choice prior to knowledge acquisition: to know or not to know. Once 
knowledge is obtained, however, agency resides in knowing itself, which, quite 
independently of the subject’s intention, sets him or her on ‘trajectories which, 
once embarked upon, have their own momentum’ (Carsten 2007: 414). 
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   I cite these works not for the sake of pure comparison, but to exploit their 
analytical possibilities for understanding Bidayuh exegeses on knowing and not-
knowing. Notably, they foreground an important but understated distinction which 
we might use to think through the case at hand: that between agency and intention. 
As revealed earlier, the mere act of knowing adat gawai has the agentive effect of 
generating ‘built-in’ relations with gawai spirits, whether or not the knower wants 
them. In the process, the knower gets bound up in a web of attendant obligations 
and regulations – such as those associated with omens – over which he or she has 
limited control. Knowing, in these cases, may thus be constitutive and potentially 
empowering, but it is simultaneously disempowering owing to the operation of 
these ‘built-in’ relations.  
 
   This divergence between agency and intention sits uneasily with many recent 
anthropological studies of the performative aspects of knowledge (e.g. Barth 1990, 
2002; Burke 2000; Lambek 1993; Lindstrom 1990). Reflecting a broader 
disciplinary interest in ‘practice’-oriented approaches (Ortner 1984), these works 
shift our focus from the semantic content of knowledge to how it is ‘managed’ 
(Harrison 1995) or ‘socially distributed’ (Simpson 1997) by human actors. This 
move, Barth argued in his 2000 Sidney Mintz lecture, ‘An Anthropology of 
Knowledge’, ‘secure[s] the space for agency in our analysis’ by ‘focusing on the 
knowers and the acts of the knowers – the people who hold, learn, produce, and 
apply knowledge in their various activities and lives’ (2002: 3). The advantage of 
this framework is thus that it avoids the danger of treating knowledge as ‘a 
context-free, knower-less entity’ (ibid.: 2). However, in concentrating its 
analytical energies on the knowers themselves, it leaves little room for an 
exploration of those knowers’ understandings of the way knowing works.  
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   This is especially problematic when dealing with indigenous tropes of 
‘knowing’ – such as pu’an – which may overlap but also differ in subtle ways 
from those used by anthropologists. A critical point of divergence, I suggest, is 
that most knower-centred anthropological models collapse both agency and 
intention in the knowing subject, treating knowledge as an abstract resource which 
he or she deploys selectively. Here, knowledge is a base for human action and 
social interaction (ibid.: 1), but is itself ontologically passive, for it can only affect 
the world if it is ‘produced, represented, transmitted, and applied’ by people (ibid.: 
10). In these models, knowledge and knowers are the key – indeed the only – 
analytical coordinates. As managers of knowledge, knowing subjects can thus 
afford to acquire as much of it as possible, because they have the presumed choice 
over what to do with it later. ‘Unactivated’ knowledge, by contrast, lies dormant, 
incapable of affecting the world without people’s active mediation.  
 
   Variations on the same theme can be found in the limited corpus of literature to 
deal concertedly with the question of ignorance, a recent example being a 2000 
ignorance-themed issue of Social Analysis.14 As Barth does with knowledge, the 
contributors to this volume largely portray ignorance as a ‘strategic’ resource 
invoked and employed by human actors in order to ‘gain beneficial relations 
within positions of power’ (Gershon and Raj 2000: 3). In these articles – which 
explore cases from Punjabi Hindus’ ‘intergenerational ignorance’ (Raj 2000) to 
the reconfiguration of gendered identities by Filipino women activists (Parnell 
2000) – ignorance and knowledge are fundamentally analytical mirror-images 
which are good to think with (Gershon and Raj 2000: 11). ‘Strategic ignorance’ is 
thus depicted as powerful by virtue of the way it is managed by its avowed non-
knowers. From a purely analytical perspective, this would be an ample description 
of how young Bidayuhs have dealt with the dangers of an ‘impurely’ Christian 
world, which I discuss further below. But to treat their invocations of ignorance as 
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simply ‘strategic’ would be misleading, because it ascribes to them the same 
combination of agency and intentionality as the literature above does to (non-
)knowers. In the process, one easily loses sight of an important feature of Bidayuh 
exegesis on the disempowering aspect of knowing arising from that crucial split 
between agency and intention. 
 
   Put differently, adat gawai may be knower-based, but it is not necessarily 
knower-centred. It is here that knowing – already prominent in my acquaintances’ 
exegetical space – emerges as a third coordinate in this paper’s analytical space. 
Unlike anthropologists who use their analytical focus on ‘knowing’ and ‘not-
knowing’ to restore ‘agency’ to their subjects (e.g. Hobart 1993: 21), the 
Bidayuhs I have mentioned are rather more ambivalent about the implications and 
effects of pu’an, which can generate relational consequences well beyond 
knowers’ intentional reach. In that sense, seeking ignorance is not merely a 
tactically empowering manoeuvre, but an admission and evasion of the potentially 
disempowering drawbacks of knowing. Central to this is the implicit 
understanding that agency and intentionality may not always converge in the same 
actor, or indeed in an actor at all. And this, as the next section argues, is the rub 
for many young Christian Bidayuhs.  
 
 
How not to read an omen 
 
Since becoming Christian, elderly villagers sometimes muse, life has become 
‘freer’. Unburdened by adat gawai’s numerous prohibitions, manual tasks, 
obligations, and omens, they simply attend church every Sunday, and make the 
sign of the cross before farming or entering the jungle. As explained earlier, such 
ruminations signal key continuities in the aims, scope, and nature of both adat 
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gawai and Christianity. But they also highlight one vital difference between them: 
relations between humans and Christian entities such as Jesus, saints, and spirits 
who now listen to Christian prayers are far less regulated by the principle of 
reciprocal communication than was the case with adat gawai. People may pray at 
an altar at the base of a hill farm before starting work, but they do so to invoke 
God’s help and blessings, not to tell him what they are doing. Neither do they wait 
for omens or signs; they simply say a prayer before commencing.   
 
   And yet, when many elderly people happen to hear certain bird cries or see 
something reminiscent of an ‘old’ omen, they often feel obliged to respond. Harris 
(2001: 89-92), for example, recalls that one of her Christian Bidayuh 
acquaintances postponed her journey instead of abandoning it when she heard a 
certain bird, while another put off her midday meal because she interpreted a bird 
call as a warning that a bone would stick in her throat. In a similarly precautionary 
episode, several elderly Christians in my fieldsite suggested, upon hearing of 
government plans to demolish a bridge at the village entrance, that the nyamba 
gawai should really hold a ritual to inform the guardian spirit (a white crocodile) 
living beneath it of what would happen. These varied and often impromptu 
responses to lingering remnants of the ‘old’ ways are, I suggest, reflective of the 
abiding conviction that adat gawai knowledge, even in scattered and dimly-
recalled fragments, still has the capacity to keep alive not only unwanted relations 
with ‘old’ spirits, but the spirits themselves – and therefore, the dangers associated 
with them. The tight bundle of knowledge and relations through which adat gawai 
operated in the past has unravelled, but only partially, in this ‘impurely’ Christian 
world.  
 
   Having examined the constitutive potential of knowing and the problematic 
divergence of agency and intention in the practice of adat gawai, we are now in 
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the position to take a closer look at invocations of ignorance by young Bidayuhs. 
As we have seen, the problem for Christians living in an ‘impurely’ Christian 
village is not merely that they can endanger themselves through proximity to 
those who keep gawai realities alive. Another concern is simply that the potential 
still exists even for Christians who possess certain kinds of gawai knowledge to 
activate relations with ‘old’ spirits. Unlike many staunchly Christian Kelabits, 
who fearlessly discuss ‘the old ways’ (Amster 1998:294; Poline Bala, personal 
communication), or certain Kayan communities (Rousseau 1998) and Ngaju 
Dayaks (Schiller 1997) who have sought to reshape and revitalize theirs as 
rationalized ‘religions’, the elderly Bidayuhs mentioned above would rather 
disengage with adat gawai – unless, as happens with omens, they are directly 
confronted with it. This often translates into a general reticence about it, which is, 
I suggest, one means by which they shield their children, younger villagers, and 
indeed ethnographers15 from the relational risks of knowing it. 
 
   Viewed in this light, young Bidayuh adults’ lack of interest in or refusal to learn 
about adat gawai is less a rejection of the contents of knowledge, than of the 
agentive effect of knowing and its ‘built-in’ relations. For knowing adat gawai 
does not merely entail the acquisition of a passive, abstract body of propositions, 
but the obligation to perform and sustain those propositions. In this regard, 
ignorance – not-knowing – may be described as an equally productive mechanism 
for denying inappropriate relations and enabling non-(adat gawai)-knowers to 
engage fully in the relations associated with Christianity. This in turn provides a 
means of not simply avoiding, but actually obviating, the dangers of living in an 
‘impurely’ Christian village. To illustrate how this works, let us return to the 
example of omen birds. 
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   Although gawai followers were obliged to heed omen birds once they had 
noticed them, they also had ways around them. One tactic employed by Bidayuhs 
in the past was to leave the house as early as possible, before birds started making 
noise (Geddes 1954: 24); another was to beat drums and gongs along the way to 
drown out competing sounds, including those of omen animals (Roth 1980: 193; 
Rousseau 1990: 133). The rationale was that if they did not hear any bird calls 
warning of danger, they would not then encounter any danger (Geddes 1954: 
24).16 This strategy invokes a peculiarly circular causal mechanism. Omens were 
not ‘communicative event’s (Rousseau 1998: 74) by which birds warned of 
distinct, pre-existing dangers. Instead, like the ‘old’ spirits, these dangers were 
constituted through people’s actions: that is, hearing, recognizing, and then not 
heeding omen birds. It was in knowing itself – in having their knowledge 
‘activated’ – that humans placed themselves in potential danger. The agentive 
potential of hazards thus arose not as a consequence of the intentions of either 
humans or birds, but in the space between them.17 Conversely, not hearing omen 
bird cries – not letting oneself be ‘made to know’ – was a viable way of evading 
danger.  
 
   Young Christian adults today, however, appear to have a more feasible means of 
placing themselves in a similarly safe position of non-recognition: by avoiding the 
first stage of knowledge acquisition altogether. In recent years, elderly people 
have noticed the gradual disappearance of omen birds, or at least their cries, from 
the village-scape: a process which they attribute mainly to the clearing of jungle 
for farming and urban development, but also specifically to Christianization. 
Villagers of all ages explain that when young people enter the jungle today, they 
do not know how to identify such birds, let alone their cries. Although they do of 
course know in a very basic sense that omen birds exist, they can safely claim 
ignorance of what they look like and how to recognize them. By not knowing how 
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to be ‘made to know’, they are thus able to forestall the dangers generated through 
disregarding omens. In a world where human beings no longer engage with them, 
these birds will gradually disappear or become spirits of a different (Christian) 
order. The security engendered by such ignorance, however, is tenuous, for it is 
always possible to acquire knowledge specific to and constitutive of that 
relationship.  
 
   This sentiment was articulated most clearly during a long conversation I had one 
Christmas with James, an IT professional in his early thirties who worked in 
Kuala Lumpur and had returned to the village for the holidays. Unlike most of his 
peers, James was unusually well-informed about adat gawai protocol because his 
father – now a respected Anglican prayer leader – had been an intensely 
knowledgeable gawai healer. In contrast to many people of his generation, the 
latter had chosen to protect his children by educating them about the dangers of 
the ‘old’ world and how to spot or circumvent them.18 But while acknowledging 
that adat gawai was his ‘culture’, James did not revel in such knowledge. 
Sometimes, he reflected, it was better to know nothing about adat gawai than to 
be a knowledgeable non-gawai follower. Like many other villagers, he reiterated 
that adat gawai would die with its practitioners. ‘Nobody wants to know about it,’ 
he said of the younger generation; ‘and if we do, we just want to forget.’  
 
   James’ partial knowledge of ‘the old ways’ had left him more circumspect than 
his peers about participating in certain village activities, such as a barbecue on a 
riverbank only accessible through the jungle where he might encounter an omen. 
His solution was to observe what he could – or, like some older Christians, try to 
‘forget’, to sever that relation – while others simply opted not to find out in the 
first place. Ignorance, I suggest, has thus become a shield for many young 
Bidayuhs; a defence against the potentially uncontrollable relation-building 
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capacity of knowing in a world where those relations are no longer wanted. 
Unlike James, however, few people engage in lengthy introspective discussions 
over the whys and wherefores of their relationship with ‘the old ways’; they 
simply say that they do not know – dǔh pu’an. Like pu’an, dǔh pu’an’s strength is 
its ambiguity; its exculpating capacity to encompass many different forms of 
ignorance, including passive ignorance (never having learned anything), partial 
but innocuous knowledge (the fact that omen birds exist, but not how to identify 
them), wilful ignorance (the active rejection of knowledge), and strategic attempts 
to ‘forget’ what is already known – all of which we have encountered in this paper.  
 
   My point in this exposition has not been to suggest that Christian Bidayuhs have 
developed a coherent system for dealing with the dangers of the ‘old’ days, but to 
highlight a common understanding shared by different parties of the agentive 
possibilities of knowing and not-knowing. Daily life in a village with an adat 
gawai presence, however, does not offer clear-cut choices between complete 
knowledge and complete ignorance; and many people constantly find themselves 
navigating an array of possibilities. While a pregnant friend experiencing pre-
partum complications chose to register for a Caesarean operation rather than 
entrust her fate to a well-known gawai healer, for example, she refused to attend 
the funeral of a distant relative because a nyamba gawai had told her that the 
deceased soul could ‘smell’ and harm unborn children. Whereas a university 
student I knew often brought visiting friends into the jungle, heedless of nearby 
bird calls, he knew enough about the skulls in the village panggah – the meeting 
and ritual house where the spoils of headhunting were customarily stored 
(Winzeler 1996) – to mutter placations to them when his friends pulled out their 
mobile phone-cameras at the sight.  
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   Perhaps the most common example of such navigation is the contemporary 
practice of pai ping: a gesture from the ‘old’ days which involves politely refusing 
food by touching it and then one’s mouth or heart, or consuming a few grains of 
rice in lieu of a full meal. This procedure arose from the belief that spiritual 
punishment would befall those who refused food – and therefore hospitality and 
social relations – which they had been offered (Geddes 1954: 55; Harris 2001: 
140; Noeb 1994: 14).19  Today, Bidayuhs of all ages observe this convention, 
although many are rather ambivalent about why they do. As a group of adults in 
their thirties explained while performing pai ping over biscuits, adhering to an 
‘old’ prescription like this was akin to taking out motor insurance – the key 
difference, I suggest, being that they were in the position to create the very 
dangers against which they were insured. But when I asked them whether this 
might change after the nyamba gawai had died and the ‘old’ spirits had 
disappeared or ‘become Christian’, I received a by now familiar response: ‘Kah! 
Dǔh ku pu’an!’ (‘I don’t know!’) 
    
 
Conclusion  
 
If the impulse to embrace rather than overcome ignorance seems counterintuitive 
to the anthropological onlooker, this is understandable given the discipline’s 
constructivist epistemological impulses. Anthropological knowledge practices 
have long been framed by what Hobart describes as an ‘implicit entelechy’ (1993: 
10) which depicts knowledge as having to be ‘grown’ – the more the better. 
Central to this is the continuing significance of the experience of fieldwork, which 
involves shifting from ‘a child’s relation to adult culture’ to ‘speaking with the 
wisdom of experience’ (Clifford 1986: 108). By the same token, it is often easy to 
assume that the people we study are similar sorts of intentional agents in amassing 
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and deploying knowledge as they see fit. Ignorance, by contrast, is pejorative: a 
failure of knowledge, a hindrance to be overcome (cf. Hobart 1993: 1; Vitebsky 
1993: 100-101). Hardly surprising, then, that ignorance usually ‘lies outside of the 
cultural epistemologies scholars analyse’ (Gershon and Raj 2000: 6). 
 
   My point here is not that anthropologists see themselves in their informants 
(though cf. Metcalf 2002 and Wagner 1981), but to caution against the 
presumption that notions – and methods – as central to anthropology as 
‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ work for ‘others’ as they do for ethnographers. 
Through an exploration of certain Bidayuhs’ conceptualizations of knowing and 
not-knowing, this paper has attempted not only to shed light on their discourses of 
ignorance, but to reflexively critique the assumptions often bound up in 
anthropologists’ own epistemological projects. My purpose has not been to add 
another meta-analytical layer of arguments about ‘knowledge’ and ‘ignorance’ to 
the situation, but to use ‘native exegesis’ – in this case, the equally vague and 
dichotomous Bidayuh tropes of pu’an and dǔh pu’an – as the basis of my 
analytical framework. 
 
   Such a move is undeniably problematic: standing at the juncture of knowledge, 
knower and the world, and yet only discernible through them, knowing and not-
knowing are elusive objects of study. But they are of vital ethnographic and 
exegetical importance to Bidayuhs I have written about, for it is precisely those 
moments that (re)embed them in networks of relations and the world. Poised on 
the threshold of a soon-to-be ‘pure’ Christian environment, these Bidayuhs have 
eschewed the agentive relational capacity of adat gawai knowledge in favour of 
the relative ease and safety offered by not-knowing. If acquaintance with adat 
gawai is ‘a process encompassing not only knowledge, but relationships’ 
(Bodenhorn 1997: 117), understanding their inseparability and mutual constitution 
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in Bidayuh exegesis helps illuminate what at first blush seems a straightforward 
case of indifference and loss.    
 
   Such an understanding also mandates a reassessment of the way anthropologists 
have generally treated ignorance as a problem to be overcome or elided, both in 
theory and in practice. Far from being an incapacitating epistemological gulf, 
ignorance is as powerful and productive as knowledge in enabling young 
Christian Bidayuhs to avoid the lingering hazards of the ‘old’ world while 
situating themselves in and constituting the new one. Viewed in this light, their 
protestations that they know nothing about adat gawai cannot be dismissed as 
merely reflections of laziness, indifference, or aspirations to ‘modernity’, but 
treated as potentially efficacious efforts to locate – and protect – themselves 
within an ‘impurely’ Christian milieu. Such Bidayuhs are by no means the 
Muchonas of anthropological whimsy – and all the more reason for us to pay 
attention to them. 
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as a short paper at the CUSAS ‘Failure’ conference in Cambridge (2006), and was 
presented in extended form at the Cambridge University Department of Social 
Anthropology’s Senior Seminar (2008). Thanks are due to participants at these events for 
their comments, and to Jacob Copeman, Mette High, Katharina Schneider, Soumhya 
Venkatesan, and Chris Kaplonski for remarks on various drafts. Finally, I am grateful to 
JRAI’s reviewers for their incisive and encouraging comments.
 
1 I use adat gawai here as a generic phrase which encompasses the practices, assumptions, 
and constituents of the Bidayuh pre-Christian ‘lifeworld’ (Harris 2001: 9).  
2 All the Bidayuh terms used here are Biatah, the dialect spoken in my fieldsite. 
3 The Brooke Raj was a private dynasty founded by English trader and explorer James 
Brooke, who wangled control of Sarawak from the Sultan of Brunei in the 1840s. The 
Brookes expanded Sarawak to its current size, obtaining recognition for it as a British 
Protectorate in 1888. White Rajah rule formally ended in 1946, when Sarawak became a 
British Crown Colony until it joined Malaysia in 1963. 
4 For detailed descriptions of adat gawai in other Bidayuh areas, see Geddes (1954), 
Harris (2001), Lindell (2000), and Nuek (2002).  
5  In the last decade, however, this pattern of outmigration has reversed: better road 
infrastructure and greater access to transport have made it easier for many Bidayuhs to 
travel regularly between their villages and urban areas, thereby creating a burgeoning 
group of village-based ‘commuters’. 
6 For in-depth studies of conversion in Bidayuh villages, see Harris (2001) and Lindell 
(2000). Detailed surveys of Christianity in Sarawak are found in Archdiocese of Kuching 
(1981), Lees (1979), Ooi (1991), Saunders (1992), and Taylor (1975). 
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7 This has not been the rule across Sarawak. Members of evangelical churches, such as the 
Kelabit and Lun Bawang, often portray conversion to Christianity as severance from a 
dark and ignorant past – although as various observers (e.g. Amster 1998: Chapter 7; Bala 
2008: Chapter 4) have noted, important continuities also underlie these discourses of 
change.  
8 A similar sentiment was expressed by Lindell’s informant, who suggested that the spirits 
would ‘return to the heavens and…no longer visit us here on Earth’ (2000: 105). 
9 Indeed Geddes noted in Mentu Tapah, the village where he worked, all omen animals 
were referred to as manuk (bird) (1961: 114). 
10 Similar examples abound in Bornean literature, for example, Amster (1998: 289-90), 
Geddes (1954: 23-24,74), Harris (2001: 89-92), Hose and McDougall (1993: 51-60), 
Lindell (2000: 110-17), Nuek (2002: 142-45, 192),  Roth (1980: 221-231), Rousseau 
(1998: 67-72), and Sidaway (1969: 45-48). 
11 Although the noun pimandai captures the generic concept of ‘knowledge’, I seldom 
heard it used in my fieldsite, as people preferred to specify what they were discussing. The 
chants learned by girls, for example, were said to be part of the adat of gawai; while the 
skill of healing has sometimes been described as a sort of uri (medicine). 
12 While the processes Ingold describes are fundamentally ontological (2006: 19), I use 
them here as particularly apt articulations of the way adat gawai operates. 
13 As I explain elsewhere (Chua 2007b), the key exceptions to this process are Malays, 
who are seen as unwilling and unable to ‘become’ anything else.  
14 Another prominent example is the edited volume by Hobart (1993), which explores ‘the 
attribution of ignorance’ as a ‘central theme’ in development policy and discourse (1993: 
4). 
15 Nyamba gawai mostly responded to my queries with vague platitudes, revealing basic 
points about adat gawai’s aims, scopes, and rituals, but never the specifics of chants, 
omens, or protocol. Upon conversing with a Canadian man whose Bidayuh wife of many 
years had refused to teach him about her ‘culture’ in order to keep him safe, however, I 
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realized that my informants might also have been protecting me – and themselves – from 
the knowledge I sought.  
16 Rousseau recounts similar episodes among the Kayan: during rituals for erecting house 
posts, for example, gongs were struck and people avoided looking upwards so they could 
neither hear nor see omens (1998: 51); if travellers in a boat noticed an omen coming from 
an inauspicious direction they could turn around so as to encounter it from the reverse 
direction (ibid.: 73). 
17  In that sense, these Bornean case studies diverge from conventional depictions of 
‘animism’ as the attribution of intentional agency to nonhuman entities (also see Rousseau 
1998: 73-74). I am grateful to one of JRAI’s reviewers for drawing out this point.  
18 Indeed, he was one of the few villagers to voluntarily teach me about specific aspects of 
adat gawai – including protocol for entering the jungle and how to recognize potentially 
malicious spirits – constantly reminding me that I now had to observe the little I knew. 
While nothing untoward happened, I, like James, often found these scraps of knowledge 
unnerving and burdensome rather than empowering.  
19 It is widely agreed that if a tourist or outsider in a similar situation fails to pai ping, they 
will probably remain unharmed, ‘because they don’t know’. Once they are told about the 
convention, however, they are obliged to follow it. 
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